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By J. William Thomas, Erika C. Ziller, and Deborah A. Thayer
Low Costs Of Defensive Medicine,
Small Savings From Tort Reform
ABSTRACT In this paper we present the costs of defensive medicine in
thirty-five clinical specialties to determine whether malpractice liability
reforms would greatly reduce health care costs. Defensive medicine
includes tests and procedures ordered by physicians principally to reduce
perceived threats of medical malpractice liability. The practice is
commonly assumed to increase health care costs. The results of studies of
the costs of defensive medicine have been inconsistent. We found that
estimated savings resulting from a 10 percent decline in medical
malpractice premiums would be less than 1 percent of total medical care
costs in every specialty. These savings are lower than most previous
estimates, and they suggest that the presumed impact of tort reform on
health care costs may be overstated.
B
ecause medical malpractice insur-
ance premiums account for less
than 2 percent of total estimated
national health spending,1 some
observers assert that tort reform
would do little to help control rising health
care costs. However, others point out that physi-
cians’ efforts to avoid malpractice litigation—by
ordering marginally useful tests, performing
marginally useful procedures, and prescribing
marginally useful medications—can add billions
of dollars to our national health care bill.
Background On Defensive Medicine
Defensive medicine is generally agreed to exist,
but the extent and the costs involved have been
the subject of much debate. A distinction is
sometimes made between “positive” defensive
medicine—extra tests or procedures performed
primarily to reduce malpractice liability—and
“negative” defensive medicine, by which physi-
cians avoid treating high-risk patients, perform-
inghigh-risk procedures, or practicing in certain
geographic areas because of fear of potential
malpractice litigation.2–4 In this paper our focus
is on positive defensive medicine.
Direct surveys of physicians during the past
thirty years have yielded estimates ranging from
21 percent to 98 percent of responding physi-
cians admitting to defensive medicine practi-
ces.3,5–7 The wide range of estimates is due to
several factors, includingdifferences among spe-
cialties and variations in survey question word-
ing. However, findings from empirical studies
using data sources, such as Medicare payments
or health claims, that describe costs and services
that were actually used in patient care suggest
that defensive medicine behavior may be less
prevalent than reported in direct surveys of
physicians.
Fear Of Litigation Some studies have re-
ported strong relationships between physicians’
fear of malpractice litigation and behavior that
may reduce litigation risks, such as the use of
caesarean section instead of vaginal birth.8–13
Other studies have found such relationships to
be complex, weak, or nonexistent.14–17
Effects On Health Care Costs Studies that
examine the effects of defensive medicine on
health care costs have produced similarly con-
flicting findings. Several studies have found
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lower health care costs in states that have
enacted direct reforms, such as limits on awards
for noneconomic damages, compared to states
that have no such reforms.18–20 Other studies
have found weak relationships, or no relation-
ships at all, between either malpractice premi-
ums and health care costs or direct reforms and
health care costs.16,17,21,22
Nearly all of the studies cited above focused on
limited sets of clinical conditions or clinical spe-
cialties, or both. However, a few recent studies
have used data supporting more comprehensive
estimates of defensive medicine costs, and these
suggest that reforms aimed at limiting damage
awards are likely to lead to only modest cost
savings.20–23
Based on these more recent studies, the
Congressional Budget Office now estimates that
decreased use of health care services associated
with specific tort reforms could reduce national
medical spending by 0.3 percent.24 A more de-
tailed review of the research cited above is avail-
able in the online Technical Appendix.25
In the study reported here, we used a recently
developed analytic methodology—called episode
definition—and a national health care claims da-
tabase that together enabled us to develop amore
precise estimate of defensivemedicine costs than
previously available. Further, we developed sep-
arate estimates for all clinical conditions and
across a wide range of physician specialties.
Study Data And Methods
Our analytic approach was similar to that of sev-
eral previously reported empirical studies of de-
fensive medicine9,10,16,17,22 in that we quantified
relationships between a “tort signal,” used as a
measure of physicians’ perceived liability risk,
and medical care costs.With those relationships
specified, we determined how costs would
change in response to developments such as tort
law reforms thatmight affect physicians’ percep-
tions of malpractice liability risks.
We drewon twoprimary sources of data for the
study. We measured health care costs using a
database of more than 400 million paid medical
and pharmaceutical claims from CIGNA Health-
Care for the two-year period July 1, 2004,
through June 30, 2006. As the tort signal, we
used data on physicians’ medical malpractice
insurance premiums.
We first describe the constructionofourhealth
care cost andmedicalmalpractice insurance pre-
mium variables. Next, we indicate how costs
were attributed to individual physicians and
how the physicians’ medical malpractice insur-
ance premiums were determined. Finally, we de-
scribe the analytic approach with which
relationships between costs and insurance pre-
miums were specified.
Costs And Premiums Claims from the CIGNA
database were grouped into episodes of care us-
ing Ingenix’s Episode Treatment Group (ETG)
software, Version 6.0.26 If, for example, claims
show a member as having a diagnosis of acute
sinusitis, the software would link the claim for
the physician office visit at which the symptoms
were diagnosed and any related claims such as
laboratory tests, imaging, or prescribed medi-
cations.
Costs on individual claims were standardized
to remove variability related to provider pricing.
Methods used for cost standardization are de-
scribed in the Technical Appendix.25 Episode to-
tal costs in our calculations reflect these
standardizations. Differences in costs between
groups of episodes indicate differences in quan-
tity and mix of services and resources used, not
price differences. Because inpatient claims are
inclusive of all services provided during inpa-
tient stays, it was not possible with these claims
data to distinguish caremanagement differences
such as the use of intensive care units.
Physicians’ medical malpractice premiums
weredeterminedusingdata fromstate insurance
department rate filings submitted by insurers.
Medical malpractice, like all other forms of in-
surance, is regulated in every state by the depart-
ment of insurance. Insurer rate filings are
considered public data in all states, accessible
through open records or freedom-of-informa-
tion requests. We obtained medical malpractice
rate filings from companies with large market
share in thirtystates,wheremore than70percent
of CIGNA members live.
Medical malpractice premiums differ by clini-
cal risk category, which is a function of specialty
and surgery and obstetrics procedures per-
formed; the amount of insurance coverage being
purchased; and the number of years of risk
exposure being insured. First-year physicians al-
ways have the lowest premiums, and physicians
who have been with a company for five or more
years, called mature physicians, always have the
highest premium rate.
We standardized the tort signal that might be
associated with different levels of malpractice
insurance coverage across physicians by using
premiums for mature physicians with policies
that insurers describe as “$1 million/$3 million
coverage,” meaning that physicians are insured
up to $1 million for each separate incident and a
total of $3 million per year. This allowed us to
eliminate variability in the tort signal.
Using data on insurer market share from the
National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners, we calculated the average medical mal-
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practice premium. The premium calculation was
weighted in terms of insurer market share by
calendar quarter for each of 61 physician risk
categories—known as Insurance Service Organi-
zation, or ISO, classes—and each of 108 mal-
practice insurance territories comprising
3,143 counties in 30 states. A state-level sum-
mary of medical malpractice premium data is
given in Technical Appendix Table 1.25
Attributing Costs To Physicians Respon-
sibility for the costs of individual episodes was
assigned to physicians on the basis of the physi-
cians’ professional costs. An episode was attrib-
uted to a physician if the physician accounted for
the largest percentage, and at least 30 percent, of
the episode’s included professional costs. This is
the episode attribution rule used bymany health
plans for provider economic profiling.
Determining Premium Rates For medical
malpractice insurance, some clinical special-
ties—such as general surgery—fall into a single
risk category. For example, ISO 80143 is for gen-
eral surgery. Many specialties, however, are di-
vided by insurers into multiple categories,
usually on the basis of amount and kinds of sur-
gery performed. For example, gynecologists are
partitioned into three risk groups—ISO 80244
for no surgery; ISO80277 forminor surgery; and
ISO 80167 for major surgery.
Although rate filings are considered public in-
formation in all states,methods used by insurers
to determine physicians’ risk-category assign-
ments are not available to the public and are
treated as proprietary by insurers. However,
we were able to define standard risk-category
assignment procedures using practice specialty
and certification designations available in
CIGNA’s provider file, and physicians’ billed ser-
vice codes available in our claims database.
To reduce the chance of surgical physicians
being misclassified as nonsurgical, we used a
statistical procedure—based on the Poisson dis-
tribution—for eachmajor andminor surgery ISO
to identify the minimum number of claims nec-
essary toassure,with95percent confidence, that
a physician having no major or minor surgery
claims was assigned the correct risk category.
Specific qualification criteria were developed
for sixty-one physician risk categories. Criteria
for cardiologists and cardiac surgeons are shown
in Technical Appendix Exhibit 1.25
Modeling Costs Of Defensive Medicine We
constructed separate analytic files for each of the
approximately 22,000 combinations of clinical
conditions and insurance risk groups. Each of
these files contained one record per physician
and included the natural log of the physician’s
average episode costs as the dependent variable
in our analyses. Each file also included average
medicalmalpractice insurancepremiums—since
premiums could differ by calendar quarter—as
the principal independent variable.
CIGNA’s member and provider files contrib-
uted data for additional independent variables,
used as control variables in our analyses. From
the provider file, controls included physicians’
state and specialty certification status.With data
from the member file, average patient age, sex,
and health status27 were calculated for each
physician. If a patient hadmultiple episodeswith
the same physician, one of the episodes was se-
lected randomly so that observations included in
averages would be independent.
One other control variable, included as a mea-
sure of physician competition, was the number
of physicians in the relevant specialty per
100,000 people in the physician’s county orMet-
ropolitan Statistical Area, which we obtained
from the Area Resource File, Health Resources
and Services Administration. Finally, each re-
cord included the number of patients managed
in that condition by the physician.
With these data, we structured two-level hier-
archicalmodels, with the physician as level 1 and
the geographic area as level 2. Hierarchical re-
gression accounts for differences in dependent
variable variance that may occur because of clus-
tering of cases—such as multiple patients man-
aged by a single physician, or multiple
physicians practicing in a single geographic
area. Average medical malpractice insurance
premium; physicians’ certification status; num-
ber of physicians per 100,000 population; and
patients’ average age, sex, and health status
served as fixed effects. Physicians’ state of resi-
dence was used as a random effect, and the num-
ber of patients as the weighting factor.
LimitationsOurmethodologyhas several lim-
itations. Although our database for calculating
market share–weighted averagemalpractice pre-
miums is as comprehensive as any previously
used in defensive medicine studies, it does not
include data for self-insured physician popula-
tions, such as large hospital systems. Further-
more, our malpractice premium rates are area
averages, and not individual physicians’ mal-
practice premium values.
Physicians’ ISO assignments were based on
procedures devised by our research team, not
by the malpractice insurers themselves. One in-
surer was willing to share with us its rules for
assigning risk categories to physicians, and we
found that percentages of physicians assigned to
the different categories by our procedures were
similar to the percentages for that insurer’s as-
signments. However, we recognize that our pro-
cedures might well differ from those of some,
perhaps many, of the other companies.
Malpractice & Errors
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Study Results
Our CIGNA claims are grouped into thirty-five
million completed episodes—that is, those with
identifiable starting and ending dates. Of these,
23millionwere attributed to physicians in the 30
states for which we have medical malpractice
insurance premium data, and physicians in
our 61 defined insurance risk groups accounted
for 22.7millionof these. Limitingour analyses to
physicians for whom we were 95 percent confi-
dent of correct insurance risk category assign-
ment and to clinical conditions that included
sufficient numbers of physicians for regression
analysis further reduced the number of episodes
to a final count of 15.4 million.
Exhibit 1 shows the results of our ISO assign-
ment process. In seventeen specialties, physi-
cians were assigned to a single ISO category.
Twelve other specialties were partitioned into
two ISOs each. Four specialties included three
ISOs each, and two specialties each included
four ISOs.
We found that increases in episode costs were
significantly related to increases in medical mal-
practice premiums in 449 of our ISO- and con-
dition-specific analyses. As shown in the right-
hand column of Exhibit 1, significant relation-
shipswere found in all but six clinical specialties;
and in all but nine specialties, significant rela-
tionships were found in multiple types of cases.
Specialty-specific results are summarized in
Exhibit 2. Results are shown by insurance risk
EXHIBIT 1






No. of 95% confident
physicians
No. of conditions with
significant results
suggesting defensive medicine
Allergy and immunology 1 3,174 3,174 4
Cardiology, interventional 1 7,882 7,882 2
Cardiovascular disease 1 9,662 9,662 3
Dermatology 2 9,739 8,854 5
Emergency medicine 2 14,493 2,973 7
Endocrinology 2 5,472 3,312 0
Family/general practice 4 86,894 16,124 15
Gastroenterology 3 4,680 943 0
Geriatric medicine 3 5,613 3,057 10
Gynecology 3 1,595 1,039 4
Infectious disease 2 5,172 1,090 6
Internal medicine 2 113,420 92,372 16
Nephrology 2 7,374 3,580 3
Neurology 2 12,344 10,674 7
Nuclear medicine 1 1,205 1,205 0
Obstetrics/gynecology 1 32,219 32,219 15
Occupational medicine 1 412 412 0
Oncology/hematology 2 12,890 7,470 14
Ophthalmology 2 18,385 16,212 1
Otolaryngology, ENT 4 9,515 1,940 2
Pediatrics 2 53,534 13,227 13
Psychiatry 2 16,978 4,656 3
Pulmonary disease 1 8,150 8,150 3
Rheumatology 1 3,179 3,179 4
Surgery, cardiovascular 1 8,939 8,939 1
Surgery, colon and rectal 1 1,771 1,771 0
Surgery, general 1 28,045 28,045 10
Surgery, hand 1 2,076 2,076 3
Surgery, head and neck 1 1,326 1,326 5
Surgery, neurological 1 4,104 4,104 3
Surgery, orthopedic 2 22,680 6,411 6
Surgery, plastic 1 5,517 5,517 4
Surgery, thoracic 1 4,406 4,406 0
Surgery, vascular 1 5,683 5,683 1
Urology 3 9,812 6,950 4
Total 61 538,340 328,634
SOURCE Authors’ analysis. NOTES Insurance Service Organization (ISO) codes denote insurance risk categories. ENT is ear, nose, and throat.
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group in Technical Appendix Tables 3 and 4.25
For example, for allergy and immunology, the
relationship between episode costs and medical
malpractice insurance premiums was positive
and significant in only 1.5 percent of episodes
analyzed. However, these clinical conditions ac-
counted for 58.6percent of all episodesmanaged
by physicians in that specialty.
Based on our results for these physicians, we
calculated that a 10 percent reduction inmedical
malpractice insurance premiumswould lead to a
savings of $350,530 across all episodesmanaged
by allergy and immunology specialists.28 (For
additional results, see Appendix Exhibit 3 in
the online Technical Appendix.)25 On a per epi-
sode basis, the estimated savings are small, and
this figure represents only 0.703 percent of
medical care costs for these physicians.
Across all specialties, reductions in medical
malpractice premiums would lead to statistically
significant savings in 2.0 percent of the condi-
tions analyzed, but these are high-volume situa-
tions, comprising 35.8 percent of all episodes.
However, themagnitude of savings that could be
realized is small, accounting for less than 1 per-
cent of medical care costs in every specialty.
Across all thirty-five specialties, savings associ-
ated with a 10 percent premium reduction in
medical malpractice premiums would be just
0.132 percent. Even if medical malpractice pre-
EXHIBIT 2
Reduction In Defensive Medicine Costs Resulting From A 10 Percent Decrease In Medical Malpractice Premiums, By Physician Specialty
Specialty Total costs ($)
% with significant
cost-to-premium
relationship Total no. of episodes






Allergy and immunology 49,829,331 1.5 90,120 58.6 350,530
Cardiology, interventional 120,761,026 0.8 38,128 5.4 92,944
Cardiovascular disease 46,648,523 0.7 33,484 0.1 11,232
Dermatology 247,381,261 1.8 1,102,908 50.7 744,438
Emergency medicine 329,848,528 0.7 324,056 1.4 81,843
Endocrinology 52,947,555 0.0 44,692 0.0 –
Family/general practice 823,313,559 3.5 3,449,928 37.1 1,579,722
Gastroenterology 9,983,307 0.0 8,479 0.0 –
Geriatric medicine 16,211,685 2.1 54,541 6.2 29,026
Gynecology 26,827,949 1.1 33,553 6.9 30,795
Infectious disease 8,923,462 1.4 12,999 30.5 23,860
Internal medicine 2,362,212,159 5.6 3,783,663 34.8 3,822,661
Nephrology 25,720,445 0.6 7,512 4.0 11,110
Neurology 258,105,183 1.3 199,898 1.9 97,313
Nuclear medicine 2,491,361 0.0 933 0.0 –
Obstetrics/gynecology 1,657,148,490 6.3 1,952,058 11.0 776,800
Occupational medicine 1,419,937 0.0 4,540 0.0 –
Oncology/hematology 817,727,501 3.4 109,414 14.3 554,850
Ophthalmology 210,479,279 1.9 510,422 19.5 332,048
Otolaryngology, ENT 69,396,082 0.2 89,220 15.0 32,553
Pediatrics 454,098,797 6.6 2,157,286 81.4 1,588,652
Psychiatry 49,968,587 0.7 33,597 5.1 170,825
Pulmonary disease 47,614,105 1.0 31,859 6.6 49,160
Rheumatology 30,893,935 1.1 20,566 8.1 65,463
Surgery, cardiovascular 16,889,114 0.6 3,399 15.9 20,521
Surgery, colon and rectal 15,668,727 0.0 11,128 0.0 –
Surgery, general 1,018,380,585 2.9 428,007 20.8 782,486
Surgery, hand 36,918,689 1.4 26,766 3.0 33,207
Surgery, head and neck 63,074,942 4.0 75,290 20.2 221,384
Surgery, neurological 240,127,600 0.8 37,739 18.6 804,769
Surgery, orthopedic 545,807,420 1.3 313,122 5.4 557,695
Surgery, plastic 112,299,110 1.5 80,382 32.4 440,932
Surgery, thoracic 44,394,508 0.0 4,242 0.0 –
Surgery, vascular 10,475,730 0.3 4,344 0.5 27,940
Urology 388,889,451 0.5 278,369 4.2 151,242
Total 10,212,877,924 2.0 15,356,644 35.8 13,486,001
SOURCE Authors’ analysis. NOTES This exhibit has been abridged because of space constraints. The complete exhibit is available online by clicking on the Technical
Appendix link in the box to the right of the article online. ENT is ear, nose, and throat.
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miumswere tobe reduced asmuchas 30percent,
defensive medicine costs would decline no more
than 0.4 percent.
Recognizing that our findings could be sensi-
tive toprocedures used for assigning ISOcodes—
specifically, our methods for qualifying 95 per-
cent confident ISO assignments—we repeated
our analyses using all physicians in the database,
not just those for whomwe were 95 percent con-
fident of ISO qualification. Results of these
analyses were quite similar to those presented
in Exhibit 2, with total savings from a 10 percent
premiumreductionaccounting for0.120percent
of total medical care costs.
Because our results also could be overly influ-
enced by small numbers of physicians in some
analyses, we reestimated our cost calculations,
using results from only those analyses that in-
cluded at least fifty-five physicians; total esti-
mated cost savings were 0.134 percent of
medical care costs.
To evaluate the validity of our cost estimate,we
“drilled down” into the episodes included in the
449 risk and category combinations identified as
significant, looking for evidence of defensive
medicinepractices. In69percent of the analyses,
we found one ormore cost components—such as
evaluation and management costs or imaging
costs—with significant positive relationships to
medical malpractice premiums. Although these
analyses do not validate all of the relationships
used in our cost calculation, they provide sup-
port for most, and they reinforce our findings of
the existence of defensive medicine practices
and their limited impact on medical care costs.
Conclusion
From our analyses, we conclude that defensive
medicine practices exist and are widespread, but
their impact on medical care costs is small. This
conclusion is similar to those of other recent
studies,18,21,23 and to that of the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO).24
There is a caution that applies to our cost es-
timate, as well as those of all empirical analyses
of defensive medicine, including the CBO study
referred to above.24 Empirical analyses such as
ours attempt to quantify relationships between
differences in physicians’ perceived liability risk
and associated behavior—in our case, behavior
that influences health care costs. If some level of
defensive behavior is shared by all ormost physi-
cians and is independent of variations in per-
ceived risk, it will not be detected in studies
such as this. However, we believe that such
behavior would not be influenced by changes
to the medical liability environment, and that
the costs associated with such behavior are
unlikely to be affected by tort system reforms,
regardless of the level of reduction in medical
malpractice insurance premiums.
Does our analysis suggest that tort reforms
such as caps on damages and limits on attorneys’
fees should not be enacted? No, because even
this small level of extra cost should be eliminated
from the system. It does suggest, though, that
claims of high levels of expected savings from
tort reform are overstated.29 ▪
Defensive medicine
practices exist and are
widespread, but their
impact on medical
care costs is small.
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